The authors propose a modi ed protocol which prevents cheating in the Online multiple secret sharing scheme proposed by Pinch.
Introduction : The goal of secret sharing scheme is to distribute a secret among a group of participants in such a way that the secret can be reconstructed by designated subsets of participants. An important issue in a secret sharing scheme is that the reconstruction procedure must provide the valid secret to all participants from an authorized set. That is, a dishonest participant must not be able to fool the others so they obtain an invalid secret while the deceiver is able to get the valid secret. This problem has been discussed by several authors (see, for example, 1], 2] and 3]).
Cachin 4] proposed a computationally secure scheme for online secret sharing with general access structures, where all the shares are as short as the secret. The scheme provides the capability of sharing multiple secrets and allows to add participants dynamically, without having to redistribute new shares. These capabilities are realized by storing additional authentic information at a publicly accessible location.
Pinch 5] points out that Cachin's scheme does not allow shares to be reused after the secret has been reconstructed without a further distributed computation protocol such as that of Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson 6] . He presents a modi ed protocol for computationally secure online secret sharing, based on the intractability of the Di e-Hellman problem, where shares can be reused.
In this letter, we show that Pinch's scheme is vulnerable to cheating. We modify Pinch's scheme to prevent cheating.
Pinch's scheme : M is a cyclic group of order q (written multiplicatively) in which the Di e-Hellman problem is intractable (that is, given elements g, g x and g y in M, it is computationally infeasible to obtain g xy ) and f : M ?! G is a oneway function. The group operations in G and M are addition and multiplication modulo a large prime p.
The set P of participants is denoted by P 1 ; : : : ; P n . Certain subsets X 2 2 P are authorized to recover the secret K. The family of minimal authorized sets of participants is denoted by ? (an authorized set X 1 is minimal if X 1 X 2 and X 2 2 ? implies that X 1 = X 2 ).
Pinch's protocol works as follows : The dealer D, who knows the secret K, randomly chooses shares s i (integers prime to q) for each participant P i 2 P and transmits s i over a secure channel to P i . For each minimal authorized set X 2 ?, jXj = t, the dealer randomly chooses g X to be a generator of M and computes T X = K ? f g Q x2X sx X and posts the pair (g X ; T X ) on the notice board. To recover the secret K, a minimal authorized set X = fP 1 ; : : : ; P t g of participants comes together and performs the following steps. 4. On behalf of the access set X, member P t reads T X from the notice board and reconstructs K as K = T X + f(V X ). If there are multiple secrets K i to share, then it is possible to use the same one-way function f, provided that each entry on the notice board has a fresh value of g X attached.
Pinch also has a variant proposal, which according to him, avoids the necessity for the rst participant P 1 to reveal g s 1 X at step 1. P 1 takes r modulo q at random and forms g rs 1 X and passes the result to P 2 , and so on. At the end of protocol, P t returns the computed value g rs 1 How to cheat : Pinch's scheme has a major disadvantage that it is vulnerable to cheating. In this scheme, a dishonest participant P i 2 X may contribute his fake share s 0 i = s i , where is a random integer modulo q. Since every participant of an authorized set X (jXj = t) has access to the nal result g Remark : Cachin's scheme is secure against this form of cheating, because in his scheme participants have no access to V X = P x2X s x . Thus, if a participant contributes a fake share, he cannot modify the result to obtain the valid secret (the function f is assumed to be one-way).
How to detect cheating : Suppose in initialization phase of the Pinch scheme, the dealer publishes g V X X (corresponding to every authorized set X). Let If the veri cation fails, then a cheating has been occurred in the protocol and thus the computed secret is not valid. This protocol detects cheating but does not detect the cheater(s) and neither prevents cheating. That is, the cheater(s) obtain the secret while the others gain nothing.
How to prevent cheating : Let C = P x2X g sx X correspond to an authorized set X. We assume that in the initialization phase of the Pinch scheme the dealer also publishes C X = g C X . Note that, this extra public information gives no useful information about the secret or about participants' shares. Otherwise, one could solve the discrete logarithm in M and easily solve the Di e-Hellman problem.
Let X be an authorized set of participants. At the reconstruction phase, every participant P i 2 X computes g s i X and broadcasts it to all participants in the set X. Thus, every participant P i 2 X receives t ? 1 values g s j X corresponding to all P j 2 X, P j 6 = P i . Each participant computes C and veri es C X ? = g C X . If the veri cation fails, then the protocol stops. Let participants agree to perform computation in the cycle P 1 ; : : : ; P t . If the check C X ? = g C X is successful, then each participant P i (i = 1; : : : t) knows the true value G s i?1 X of its predecessor (P t is the predecessor of P 1 ). So participant P i (i = 1; : : : ; t) initiates the protocol by computation the value (g s i?1 X ) s i and passing it to P i+1 . The protocol proceeds as in the Pinch scheme and ends at P i?2 . In this way, the participant P i?1 cannot directly contribute to the computation which started by P i .
Let there exists only one cheater, P i (1 i t) in the system. So if P i cheats, the computation initiated by P i+1 must be correct (the correctness can be veri ed as g V X X ? = g V 0 X X , where V 0 X is the result obtained by P i?1 ). That is, although cheating is occurred, the honest set of participants can recover the secret.
If there exists a group of collaborating cheaters, then in the above protocol each participant must play (simultaneously) the role of P 1 for every other t 1 participants in the set X. Although the number of computations increases rapidly, before completing the protocol any possible cheating will be detected and the protocol will be stopped. Because, at stage j (1 < j < t) for every set of j (out of t) participants (without loss of generality, let they are P 1 ; : : : ; P j ) there will be j! di erent computations of g s 1 s j X . So, inequality of these values indicates a cheating in the system. Moreover, assuming the majority of participants are honest (this is a reasonable assumption for any robust secret sharing scheme) the minority of participants who obtain values di erent from the common value in stage j, are cheaters.
Remark : A group of m cheaters can cheat the system at rst stage, that is, they can contribute with fake shares such that the resulting C is equal to the original one. However, the above protocol detects their cheating in next stages (there are at least 2m + 1 stages for such a set of collaborating participants). 
